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MEDICAL FUTILITY AND RELIGIOUS FREE
EXERCISE
Teneille Ruth Brown*
INTRODUCTION
A tragic scenario has become all too common in hospitals
across the United States. Dying patients pray for medical
miracles when their physicians think that continuing treatment
would render no meaningful benefit. This situation is
unfortunately referred to as “medical futility.” A fraught term,
“medical futility” covers any request for treatment that is
considered inappropriate because it “merely preserves
permanent unconsciousness or cannot end dependence on
intensive medical care . . . .”1 In these cases, physicians, who are
less likely than their patients to rely on God as a means of coping
with major illness, are at an impasse.2 Their patients request
everything be done so that they can have more time for God to
intervene, but in the physician’s professional experience,
everything will probably do nothing. What is the physician to do?
The conundrum is a modern one: medical technologies
such as breathing machines and dialysis units can support
human bodies almost indefinitely when many of our organs fail.
But is there any limit on this technological imperative? Every
state and the U.S. Constitution recognize that a patient has the
legal right to refuse unwanted treatment, even if it is lifesustaining.3 However, there is no corresponding constitutional
*

Professor of Law at the University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law and Adjunct
Professor of Internal Medicine at the University of Utah. This article is based in part
on an empirical project I conducted and published as part of the 2015 Petrie-Flom
Conference on Law, Religion and Health Care at Harvard Law School. A related
article explores health care providers’ views of medical futility and religion. See
Teneille Brown, Accommodating Miracles, in LAW, RELIGION, AND HEALTH IN THE
UNITED STATES (Holly Fernandez Lynch, I. Glenn Cohen, & Elizabeth Sepper, eds.,
Cambridge University Press 2017). This research was also made possible in part
through generous support from the Albert and Elaine Borchard Fund for Faculty
Excellence.
1
Lawrence J. Schneiderman, Nancy S. Jecker, & Albert R. Jonsen, Medical Futility:
Its Meaning and Ethical Implications, 112 ANNALLS INTERNAL MED. 949, 949 (1990).
2
Farr Curlin et al., Religious Characteristics of U.S. Physicians, 20 J. GEN. INTERNAL
MED. 629, 631–632 (2005).
3
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (“But for purposes of
this case, we assume the United States Constitution would grant a competent person
a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.”); see

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2977430
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right to demand specific treatments.4 This is not simply about the
ability to pay. Even if an individual’s private insurance would
cover aggressive treatments, or if the individual had the financial
means to pay out of pocket, a physician need not offer treatments
to a patient if in her judgment they would be medically
ineffective, or futile. Tort law recognizes this professional
deference by defeating a negligence claim if the physician
complied with the medical standard of care.5
To underscore this professional deference, most states
have passed so-called “medical futility statutes.”6 These statutes
make it explicit that physicians have immunity from negligence
claims if a physician refuses to offer futile treatment, so long as
particular statutory safeguards are met.7 Physicians are generally
quite reluctant to invoke these statutes, but they are particularly
reluctant to do so when the patient’s request for treatment is
based on a religious belief in miracles. There is a sense that
religious reasons are different and should be given special
consideration. Religious-based challenges to medical futility
policies place individuals at odds with secular providers and the
state, and “frequently generate particularly difficult questions
about the proper relationship between religiously faithful citizens
and the sovereign government.”8 Even if there is no general legal
entitlement to medical care and physicians may be immunized
from negligence claims, can the invocation of a state’s medical
futility statute violate free exercise? This is the question I address
in this article.
also Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1137 (1986) (“[A] person of
adult years and in sound mind has the right, in the exercise of control over his own
body, to determine whether or not to submit to lawful medical treatment.”) (citation
omitted).
4
Abigail All. for Better Access to Dev. Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 712
(D.C. Cir. 2007). For a discussion of the restrictions on the limited right to medical
care for prison inmates under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, see also Carl
Drechsler, Annotation, Relief Under Federal Civil Rights Acts to State Prisoners
Complaining of Denial of Medical Care, 28 A.L.R. Fed. 279 (1976).
5
Joseph H. King, The Common Knowledge Exception to the Expert Testimony Requirement
for Establishing the Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice, 59 ALA. L. REV. 51, 51
(2007).
6
Thaddeus Mason Pope, Medical Futility Statutes: No Safe Harbor to Unilaterally Refuse
Life-Sustaining Treatment, 75 TENN. L. REV. 1, 1 (2007) (“Over the past fifteen years,
a majority of states have enacted medical futility statutes that permit a health care
provider to refuse a patient's request for life-sustaining medical treatment.”).
7
Id.
8
Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Free Exercise of Religion Before the Bench: Empirical
Evidence from the Federal Courts, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1371, 1372 (2013).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2977430
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This article has just two parts. The first part will
contextualize the problem by describing the history of medical
miracles, and why there are so many appeals to them in modern
medical practice. The second part will explain why medical
futility statutes do not violate a patient’s religious free exercise,
as this concept has developed under the Supreme Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence and state and federal Religious
Freedom Restoration Acts.
I. THE HISTORY AND UBIQUITY OF MEDICAL MIRACLES
A. All Five Major World Religions Promote Belief in “Miracles”
A 2013 Harris Poll indicated that a whopping 72% of
Americans believe in divine miracles. This is down from
previous polls, but still quite high compared to other Western
countries.9 An older poll conducted by Time/CNN reported that
77% of Americans believed “that God sometimes intervenes to
cure people who have serious illnesses.”10 “This same poll
report[ed] that 82% of Americans” believe in the power of prayer
to heal the sick.11 Eighty-two percent. We are hard-pressed to
find any other question related to personal beliefs with such a
high percentage of agreement.
Miracle narratives are found in all five of the major world
religions, and healing miracles are prominent among them.
However, the symbolic value and meaning of miracles is
different in the context of each faith. For example, what we
would today refer to as a “miracle” has no synonym in Hebrew.
The writers of the Jewish bible had no conception of an
occurrence that would violate the laws of nature, given that the
divine and ordinary worlds could not be separated.12
9

Larry Shannon-Missal, Americans’ Belief in God, Miracles and Heaven Declines, HARRIS
POLL (Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.theharrispoll.com/health-andlife/Americans__Belief_in_God__Miracles_and_Heaven_Declines.html.
10
Claudia Wallis, Faith and Healing, TIME, June 24, 1996, at 58. Peter H. Van Ness &
David B. Larson, Religion, Senescence, and Mental Health, AM. J. OF GERIATRIC
PSYCHIATRY 386 (2002).
11
Id.
12
What we would today call “miracles” are clustered around the Moses stories of
Exodus and Numbers, and the Elijah and Elisha stories in R. Walter L. Moberly,
Miracles in the Hebrew Bible, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO MIRACLES 62
(Graham Twelftree ed., 2011).
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Hinduism,13 Buddhism,14 and Catholicism15 believe that
modern miracle-workers exist among us and reinforce our faith.
Each of these faiths discourages the display of miracles for their
own sake, and enlightened Buddhists who publicize the miracles
they perform are frowned upon.16 The centrality and significance
of miracles varies depending on the religion. For example, the
many documented miracles of Mohammed are “not at all as
central to Muslim faith as the miracles of Jesus are to
Christians.”17
In some religions such as Judaism and Islam, familiar
stories that today would be described as “miracles” are
contextualized as having occurred thousands of years ago——
when new religions competed with magical paganism and
needed to prove their divine power and truths.18 For millennia,
Protestants also believed that miracles only occurred in biblical
times.19 However, the notion of the “limited age of miracles” was
reconsidered and largely abandoned by Protestant theologians in
13

Yogis perform “bodily feats which an outsider might judge to be superhuman”;
“[t]hey can live for weeks without nourishment, endure fantastic extremes of heat
and cold, go into suspended animation, stop breathing (or nearly so) for hours, [and]
change their rate of heartbeat.” Even so, yogis would not likely describe this as a
“miracle,” and instead they view these as “psychosomatic techniques that are done
at will.” GEOFFREY ASHE, MIRACLES 131 (1st ed. 1978). The Hindu faith does not
emphasize the distinction between the natural and the unnatural worlds, and so the
word “miracle” possesses different connotations than it does for us today. The
miracles of the Hindu faith are often the result of power-plays between a
manifestation of a Hindu god, and some demon, where the Hindu god prevails and
reveals his prowess. All of life is in God’s hands, and so while it seems that the gods
are playful and sometimes spiteful, miracles are happening all of the time. KENNETH
L. WOODWARD, THE BOOK OF MIRACLES 265–66 (2000).
14
The miracles of the Buddha, Siddhartha, take on cosmic proportions, and reveal
his superiority over all other beings. The Buddha was the only being who had
complete control of his final rebirth. He chose where, when, and in which family to
be reborn for the last time. He also makes someone near him invisible to another and
overpowers fiery dragons by himself bursting into flames. See Rupert Gethin, Tales of
Miraculous Teachings: Miracles in Early Indian Buddhism, in THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO MIRACLES 216, 221 (Graham H. Twelftree ed., 2011).
15
Peter Berger, The Hospital: On the Interface Between Secularity and Religion, 52
SOCIETY 410, 412 (2015).
16
WOODWARD, supra note 13, at 24.
17
While the moon was split in two at Mecca when Muhammed asked for a sign from
Allah, and he repeatedly fed huge groups of people on tiny amounts of food, these
miracles are not central to Muhammed’s biography. They are instead merely
referenced in a list format. Id. at 184–85 (citing L. ZOLONDEK, BOOK XX OF ALGHAZALI’S IHYA’ ULUM AL-DIN 45 (1963)).
18
ROBERT BRUCE MULLIN, MIRACLES AND THE MODERN RELIGIOUS IMAGINATION,
191–92 (Yale Univ. Press ed., 1996).
19
Id.
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the early twentieth century in light of a need to explain the
relationship between God and the modern world.20
Whether God intervenes directly to perform modern
miracles remains an essential question to many religious
thinkers. What one group may refer to as mere providence or
good luck, another might attribute to the indirect workings of
God. This difficulty differentiating between good luck and divine
intervention is nowhere more pronounced than in medicine. The
relationship between the healing arts and religious miracles goes
back to ancient times and carries through, in some
denominations, to the present. The Greek God Asklepios
performed miraculous medical feats, including curing facial
injuries, kidney stones, weapon wounds, and blindness, and
removing tumors, lice, worms, headaches, infertility, chest
infections, and disfigured limbs.21 Incidentally, he sometimes
used snakes in his treatments, and the rod of Askelpios, the
snake-entwined staff, remains a leading symbol of medicine.22
In the present day, Christians are the religious group that
most frequently pray for, and expect, modern healing miracles.23
This is perhaps unsurprising, as so many of Jesus Christ’s
miracles involved healing the sick and physically disabled.24
Jesus makes the blind see; he renders the paralyzed able to walk;
he cures lepers and epileptics.25 Christ is even capable of healing
from a distance, as when he removed the fever from a dying boy
and restored him to health.26 As Christian sects have divided and
20

Since the early 1900s, Protestant clerics now state that the healing of the present
day may be connected with the gifts of healing that the apostles exhibited in the
bible. Id.
21
HOWARD CLARK KEE, MIRACLES IN THE EARLY CHRISTIAN WORLD 78–86 (Yale
Univ. Press ed., 1983) (“[Asklepios the Healer] appears throughout these centuries
not only as the agent of divine cures but also as the founder of the medical profession
. . . . as a human being with therapeutic skills, as a hero, and as a god . . . attempts to
trace the development of this figure have not produced definitive results.”).
22
See What’s in a Symbol, UF HEALTH, http://humanism.med.ufl.edu/chapmanprojects/art-of- medicine-project- 2005-2006/whats-in-a- symbol/ (last visited Nov.
8, 2016).
23
WOODWARD, supra note 13, at 21 (“[O]f all the world religions, Christianity is the
one that has most stressed miracles.”).
24
See Patrick J. Kiger, What Do the World’s Religions Say About Miracles?, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC, http://channel.nationalgeographic.com/the-story-of-god-withmorgan-freeman/articles/what-do-the-worlds-religions-say-about- miracles/ (last
visited Nov. 8, 2016).
25
See id.
26
WOODWARD, supra note 13, at 131.
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subdivided, there exists great variety between groups in
interpreting Jesus’s biblical healing miracles. Some groups read
these miracles metaphorically, while others view them as having
occurred exactly as described.27 Either way, the stories of Jesus’s
healing miracles hold a central place in the Christian ethos.
The role of healing miracles in Catholicism is particularly
well documented. A fascinating and thorough review of the
Vatican canonization archives demonstrates that 95% of more
than 600 miracles performed by candidates for Catholic
sainthood between 1600 AD and 2000 AD involved healing the
sick or disabled.28 The connection between miraculously healing
the blind, epileptic, those suffering from tuberculosis, unknown
paralysis, and other ailments has close scriptural connections to
the Catholic faiths, and in the more modern experiences of
evangelical Christian faiths.29 Even so, this practice became
marginalized with the rise of scientific medicine in the early
twentieth century.30
Healing miracles reappeared after 1945 in the Christian
Pentecostalism movement.31 The practice of “praying for the
sick was revived on a scale hitherto unknown.”32 As a result,
it became commonplace for many Christians to believe that
God is “capable of effecting miraculous healings, with
significant numbers claiming to have been ‘healed’ of physical
or mental ailments.”33 This branch of Christianity spread
throughout the world, particularly in West Africa, India,
South Africa, and the Southern United States and gave rise to
testaments where “paralytics arise from wheelchairs, stiff knees
become flexible, cancerous ulcers disappear, and headaches
vanish.”34 It is likely this cultural script or story has stuck with
27

See Barry L. Blackburn, The Miracles of Jesus, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO
MIRACLES 113, 124 (Graham H. Twelftree ed., 2011).
28
Jacalyn Duffin, The Doctor Was Surprised; or, How to Diagnose a Miracle, 81 BULL.
HIST. MED. 699, 706 (2007); see also WOODWARD, supra note 13, at 367.
29
Andrew Singleton, “Your Faith Has Made You Well”: The Role of Storytelling in the
Experience of Miraculous Healing, 43 REV. RELIGIOUS RES. 121, 121 (2001).
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id. (quoting JOHN T. NICHOL, PENTECOSTALISM 221 (1966)).
33
Id.
34
Jorg Stolz, “All Things Are Possible”: Towards a Sociological Explanation of Pentecostal
Miracles and Healing, 72 SOC. RELIGION 456, 456, 458 (2011) (“When critics say that
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many Americans and has provided modern exemplars of
miraculous healing through prayer.
While not meant to be exhaustive, this brief and sweeping
introduction may provide some context for the modern requests
for miracles in hospitals across the country. Dating back to
ancient times, references to miracles often involved the healing
arts as well as the ability of God to change the shape of objects,
triumph over supernatural demons, resurrect the dead, or light
things on fire.35 The rise of Christian miracle revival stories
occurred simultaneously with the growth of modern medical
technologies such as sterile surgery, chemotherapy, dialysis, or
artificial breathing. In this post-scientific world, the idea that
God could save you from floods or burning houses has
somewhat receded from our popular landscape.36 But medicine
and healing remain a central part of our culture.37 The role of
miracle-making in this domain has ballooned where the stories
of God proving his existence through threatening species
extinction, contests between gods, or transmutation have
diminished. The search for God in the modern world has settled
on finding his presence in the hospital or clinic.
B. Religious Patients, Secular Physicians
The fact that people turn to religion in times of health
crisis does not necessarily render the appeals to miracles suspect.
If there were just one time in a person’s life when she will pray
for a miracle, it is likely to be at the bedside of a dying loved one.
Medical crises often lead to intensification of religiosity and
powerful religious conversions.38 This phenomenon does not just
[Pentecostal] healers produce ‘only a placebo effect,’ these anthropologists answer
that, precisely, the placebo effect shows that humans are a socio-psycho-physical
entity in which the symbolic may have an effect on the physical[.]”) (citations
omitted).
35
WOODWARD, supra note 13, at 63–64, 69–70, 130–31.
36
See e.g. Michael Lipka, Why American’s ‘Nones’ Left Religion Behind, PEW RES.
CENTER, Aug. 24, 2016, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/08/24/whyamericas-nones-left-religion-behind/#.
37
For a representative collection of movies, novels, and other popular culture items
that feature medicine, spirituality, and healing, see Jenn Lindsay, Larry A. Whitney
& Stephanie N. Riley, Spirituality, Medicine, & Health – Popular Culture, BOSTON
UNIVERSITY PERSONAL WEBSITES
http://people.bu.edu/wwildman/smh/content_popculture.htm.
38
Kenneth Ferraro and Jessica Kelley-Moore, Religious Consolation Among Men and
Women: Do Health Problems Spur Seeking? 39 J. OF SCI. STUDY OF RELIGION 220, 226–
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hold for religious nations, where the religious beliefs parallel the
level of religious practice. The more secular a nation is in its
public sphere and religious practice, the more likely its citizens are
to turn to hospitals as religious forums when disease strikes.39 As
one researcher put it, in the low-religiosity nation of Denmark,
the “[p]rayer houses . . . are no longer the churches but the
hospitals.”40
There is an intense sociological connection between our
culture and the way we die. In addition to the rich history of
religiously moderated medical miracles, patients may separately
hope for a miracle because of significant changes in the way
Americans experience death. In the early part of the last century,
we used to die at younger ages, from infections, childbirth, and
wounds.41 We now have nearly doubled our life expectancy from
47 years in 1900 to 78 in 2008.42 We are less likely to die from
acute infections, and are more likely to die of chronic conditions
like heart failure, cancer, and diabetes.43 Many now believe that
“sickness, pain, and premature death were no longer viewed as
immovable points on the human landscape, but as problems that
could be removed through human intelligence and ingenuity.”44
This raises another important change in the sociology of
the Western Christian world: the “mundanization” of ordinary
life.45 While earlier Christian cultures in the United States and
elsewhere focused on the after-life, there is much greater focus
now on this life.46 Put differently, while good Christians used to
227 (2000).
39
Niels Christian Hvidt, Patient Belief in Miraculous Healing: Positive or Negative Coping
Resource?, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO MIRACLES 309, 311 (Graham H.
Twelftree ed., 2011) (footnote omitted).
40
Id.
41
Tenielle R. Brown, Denying Death, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 977, 980 (2015) [hereinafter
Brown I].
42
Id. at 981.
43
Id. There is some data to suggest that our life expectancies continued to rise in the
latter part of the 20th century, and was correlated with passage of the Medicare Act.
However, other countries saw an increase in their life expectancies around the same
time and so it is not clear whether the correlation is in fact causal. See Muriel
Gillick, How Medicare Shapes the Way We Die, 8 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 27, 33
(2012); Expectation of Life at Birth, 1970 to 2008, and Projections, 2010 to 2020, Table 104,
STAT. ABSTRACT U.S. 77 (2012),
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0104.pdf.
44
MULLIN, supra note 18, at 85.
45
Id. at 86.
46
Id.
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work toward a good death, now they work toward a good life.
Death became a scientific phenomenon to be solved by
mortals.47 This presented a dramatic change in how Americans
died. We used to die at home, surrounded by loved ones.48 We
struggled to practice a good or “holy” death, where we
gracefully accepted the will of God, welcomed the chance to
atone our sins, and did not treat illness as a war to be won.49
Conversely, the opposite is now true. The degree of one’s
religious coping is now positively correlated with receiving
more intensive and life-prolonging care.50
Despite the fact that most Americans would still prefer
to die at home, most of us no longer do; we are much more
likely to die in hospitals, acute care facilities, or intensive care
units.51 Hospitals used to be staffed by Catholic nuns when they
first began as religious charities that served the poor.52
However, hospitals are now are much more likely to serve all
socioeconomic groups and have a secular and for-profit
corporate structure.53 The secular orientation of most of these
facilities means that health care providers (“providers,” going
forward) generally do not see their role as a spiritual one.54
Even if they are religious in their private lives, they do not see
this as bearing on their clinical work.55 This means that while
47

DREW GILPIN FAUST, THIS REPUBLIC OF SUFFERING: DEATH AND THE AMERICAN
CIVIL WAR 6–7 (2008).
48
Id.
49
Id. at 6–10 (“The concept of the Good Death was central to mid-nineteenthcentury America, as it had long been at the core of Christian practice. Dying was an
art, and the tradition of ars moriendi had provided rules of conduct for the moribund
and their attendants since at least the fifteenth century: how to give up one’s soul
‘gladlye and wilfully’; how to meet the devil’s temptations of unbelief, despair,
impatience, and worldly attachment…”).
50
Hanneke W. M. van Laarhoven, Johannes Schilderman & Judith Prins, Religious
Coping and Life-Prolonging Care, 302 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 257, 257 (2009).
51
Id.
52
Barbra Mann Wall, The Pin-Striped Habit: Balancing Charity and Business in Catholic
Hospitals, 1865–1915, 51 NURSING RES. 50, 50 (2002) (“Between 1865 and 1915,
Catholic sister-nurses built impressive hospital networks throughout the United
States. These hospitals were, first, manifestations of religious and charitable ideals.”).
53
Martha Minow, Partners, Not Rivals?: Redrawing the Lines Between Public and Private,
Non-Profit and Profit, and Secular and Religious, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1061 (2000); Jason M.
Kellhofer, The Misperception and Misapplication of the First Amendment in the American
Pluralistic System: Mergers Between Catholic and Non-Catholic Healthcare Systems, 16 J.L.
& HEALTH 103 (2002).
54
Curlin et al., supra note 3, at 632.
55
Id.
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hospitals are the location of death for most of us, they are
usually ill-equipped to deal with the religious aspects of death.
While very recent trends show that fewer Americans are
dying in hospitals or nursing homes, about 70% still do, 56 and
many die just days after receiving aggressive care.57 This
relatively new shift from dying at home to dying in a facility may
have disrupted cultural notions about the role of health care
providers in the end of life. Of course, nurses and doctors treat
infection, prematurity, pain, heart disease and cancer, but when
these treatments are offered so near one’s death, how could the
clinical work be so neatly divided from the spiritual?
Medicine has really struggled with this new normal.
Indeed, providers and staff are less religious than the patients
they treat on average, and are distressed when patients are
perceived to shut down the end-of-life conversation by playing
the “trump card” of “waiting for a miracle.”58 Many studies
report that providers feel untrained and uncomfortable
discussing the spiritual aspects of end of life care. 59 It is no
wonder that the majority of Americans report that providers
never spoke to them about what they want their death to be like,
56

See CDC, DEATH STATISTICS (Apr. 9, 2008),
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/dvs/Mortfinal2005_worktable_309.pdf.
57
Murray Enkin et al., Death Can Be Our Friend: Embracing the Inevitable Would Reduce
Both Unnecessary Suffering And Costs, 343 BRIT. MED. J. 1277, 1277 (2011) (“Too many
people are dying undignified graceless deaths in hospital wards or intensive care
units, with doctors battling against death way past the point that is humane.”); see
Derek C. Angus et al., Use of Intensive Care at the End of Life in the United States: An
Epidemiologic Study, 32 CRITICAL CARE MED. 638–643 (2004) (nearly forty percent of
all deaths nationwide occur in the acute care setting and approximately twenty
percent involve the use of intensive care services); Alvin C. Kwok et al., The Intensity
and Variation of Surgical Care at the End of Life: A Retrospective Cohort Study, 378 THE
LANCET 1408, 1408 (2011) (“A fifth of elderly Americans die in intensive-care
services and of these patients, about half undergo mechanical ventilation and a
quarter undergo cardiopulmonary resuscitation in the days before death.
Furthermore, the intensity of end-of-life care varies substantially on the basis of the
facility where patients receive care.”).
58
Paul R. Helft, Waiting for a Miracle, CANCER NETWORK: ONCOLOGY J. (2014),
http://www.cancernetwork.com/oncology-journal/waitingmiracle#sthash.YPtTbtXB.dpuf (“[A]lthough it is clear from national survey data
that US adults are extraordinarily likely to believe that such supernatural events as
divine healing can occur, healthcare professionals are consistently less likely to
believe in them. However, because of the special respect we give to faith-based
claims, ‘waiting for a miracle’ can become a sort of ‘trump card’ that is capable of
shutting down further attempts to limit treatments.”).
59
Bernard Lo et al., Discussing Religious and Spiritual Issues at the End of Life: A Practical
Guide for Physicians, 287 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 749, 749 (2002).
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or the spiritual aspects of these medical decisions.60 Given this
portrait, how could this imperfect mixing of the roles of the
religious and the medical not be perplexing to most Americans?
How could it not lead to moral confusion about the role of prayer
and religious belief at the end of life? Physicians shepherd their
patients through the war on death, but often do little to prepare
them for when the battle is ultimately lost.
Another important factor in this equation is the
development of artificial life support. More Americans are dying
in medical facilities precisely because they are suffering from
organ failure that can be supported by relatively new medical
devices.61 A disorder that would have led to an imminent death
a hundred years ago can now be treated with machines, and
reimbursed through insurance. Our kidneys can be dialyzed, our
stomachs can be fed through tubes, our lungs can be ventilated,
our bladders can be evacuated, our hearts can be pumped, and
our diaphragms can be paced. The advent of these life-sustaining
devices is miraculous in one sense of the word, as life can be
artificially supported, sometimes indefinitely. However, these
advances also challenge our religious beliefs about when to give
up hope and acknowledge it is the end. Artificial life support
certainly challenges our very definitions of death. Is someone
with minimal brain activity, but who is breathing, eating, and
performing other life functions that are only possible because of
artificial support from machines, still alive? In this metaphysical
sense, medicine has been a victim of its own success.
The cultural, religious, institutional and technological
developments of the last century have led us to rely on doctors
as our partners in fighting death. With more and more
medicines, procedures, and data, physicians have become
modern day miracle workers in combatting death and disease.
They have been our partners in this fight. In one study, eighty
percent of Southern respondents viewed physicians as “God’s
mechanics.”62 But these same doctors are not theologians, they
60

Brown I, supra note 42, at 987–988.
Suzanne Prevost & J. Brandon Wallace, Dying in Institutions, in DECISION MAKING
NEAR THE END OF LIFE: ISSUES, DEVELOPMENT, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 189–90
(James Werth and Dean Blevins eds., 2008).
62
Forty percent believed “God's will is the most important factor in recovery,” and
62

54

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15

are healers, and increasingly driven by data. When we ask these
same people to take seriously the hope for religious prayer, some
are sympathetic, but many see this final pursuit as outside the
realm of their expertise.63
The progress of modern medicine has led us to mutually
engage in recovery narratives with our doctors. We are fighting
cancer, heart disease, together. We will try subsequent
treatments, and we will prevail. But of course this is the
optimistic narrative physicians tell, to keep patients hopeful and
to avoid uncomfortable conversations about near death.
Patients and their surrogates may be particularly flummoxed
when providers refer to any additional treatment as “futile,”
and recommend withdrawing life-sustaining treatment. Why
are these doctors, who have been helping us fight death for so
long, suddenly giving up? Do they not believe in miracles? Did
they lose their faith? Why will they not give this loved one just
a little more time?
It is not always religious differences that motivate
conflicts over medical futility. In some cases, the provider’s
financial motives, as a steward of hospital or insurance
resources, might be questioned.64 The surrogate might also
distrust the provider on a more personal level, and wonder
whether their loved one is being hustled toward death because
of his lack of education and money, or because of his race or
ethnicity.65 Even when the conflict is not borne of distrust, the
surrogates might still be in denial of their loved one’s prognosis,
and unable to come to grips with the fact that she will never
return to the way she was. The provider, as the bearer of this
the study found that spiritual faith in healing was stronger among women than men.
Christopher J. Mansfield et al., The Doctor as God’s Mechanic? Beliefs in the Southeastern
United States, 54 SOC. SCI. & MED. 399–409 (2002).
63
This sentiment is based on my experience on hospital ethics committees and the
response to requests for religious miracles.
64
Rationing and futility are two different things. “Rationing refers to the allocation
of beneficial treatments among patients; [whereas] futility refers to whether a
treatment will benefit an individual patient.” Robert D. Truog, Medical Futility, 25
GA. ST. U.L. REV. 985, 990 (2009) (quoting Lawrence J. Schneiderman et al., Medical
Futility: Its Meaning and Ethical Implications, 112 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 985, 988
(1996)).
65
“Futility cases most commonly involve patients and families from the more
marginalized and disadvantaged segments of our society. These are families who
have lived on the outskirts of our healthcare system, and who have frequently been
denied or perceive that they have been denied, care that is beneficial.” Id. at 988.
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dark and unhopeful news, may be punished for being the
messenger. While each of these is important and can work in
tandem with other reasons, I am not addressing any of them
specifically in this article. Here I will focus on the situation
where the patient, surrogate or family believe in God’s divine
ability to work miracles, and are concerned that this belief is
not mirrored or supported by the hospital or staff.
For the surrogate who wants to conserve life, there are
likely asymmetrical costs. If we pray for a miracle, it just might
happen, but if we withdraw or discontinue life-sustaining
treatments, our loved one will almost certainly die. Many things
may fuel this belief in miracles: religious tradition, personal
spirituality, or even a pop culture recollection of a patient who
suddenly “woke up” after years of being on a ventilator. 66 They
hope that their loved one will similarly beat the odds, and they
are disappointed that the clinicians hold out no such hope. They
are not thinking of balancing data on probable outcomes, costs,
and availability of hospital beds. They are understandably just
thinking of their loved one.
When patients or families contest the withdrawal of
treatment, it puts providers in a very uncomfortable position. In
addition to being empiricists rather than theologians, providers
may have chosen their profession because they saw something
special in the doctor-patient relationship. The latter part of the
twentieth century saw a transition in this relationship from a
model of “doctor knows best” toward a model that prioritizes the
autonomy and wishes of the patient.67 This valuable shift has
inadvertently engendered a more commercial model of health
care, where the patient views herself as a customer.68 It is fair to
66

See, e.g., NICHOLAS SPARKS, THE CHOICE (Grand Central Publishing 2007) (where
a woman wakes up after being in a coma for a significant period of time); WHILE
YOU WERE SLEEPING (Buena Vista Pictures Distribution, Inc. 1995).
67
Robert Veatch, Doctor Does Not Know Best: Why in the New Century Physicians Must
Stop Trying to Benefit Patients, 25 J. OF MED. AND PHILOSOPHY 701, 702 (2000).
68
Mark A. Hall, The Legal and Historical Foundations of Patients As Medical Consumers,
96 GEO. L.J. 583, 586 (2008); Robert Pearl, Are You A Patient Or A Healthcare
Consumer?, FORBES (Oct. 15, 2015),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertpearl/2015/10/15/are-you-a-patient-or-ahealth-care-consumer-why-it-matters/#68088ba65c3a (“Advocates who insist on
calling us ‘consumers’ believe that high-tech can solve nearly all of healthcare’s
challenges. They argue that in the digital age, control has shifted to the individual
and must continue to do so.”).
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say that most providers do not like this trend.69 They resist
medicine becoming just another commercial good, “like
breakfast cereal and toothpaste.”70 And they do not want to be
“indentured servants” or “grocers,” required to provide
whatever treatment their patients and surrogates want. 71 This
offers yet another reason why the conflict between provider and
family can become so intractable when the family demands
certain life-sustaining care that the provider believes are
inappropriate.
In addition to resisting the commercial model of health
care, nurses and physicians also resist feeling complicit in
“torturing” a patient with ventilators, pokes, and tracheotomies.
If they chose their profession in order to heal, as most nurses and
physicians do, then this can be emotionally draining if their
present work feels diametrically opposed to this goal. This
emotional toll may be especially pronounced when the patient is
unlikely to receive any clinical benefit, but the treatments cause
visible pain or distress.72 In these cases, appeals to medical futility
may address the provider’s spiritual as well as professional needs.
While the family is praying for a miracle, the provider might be
hoping or praying for the patient’s physical pain to end, along
with their role in perpetuating it.
C. Tragic (Sometimes Legal) Conflicts Between Patients and Providers
Some reading this will remember the case of Baby Rena,
from the early 1990s. Baby Rena was HIV+ and had respiratory
distress and cardiac failure.73 She had excessive cerebral spinal
fluid in her brain, kidney dysfunction, needed a ventilator to
69

Pope, supra note 6, at 15.
George Annas, Asking the Courts to Set the Standard of Emergency Care – The Case of
Baby K, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1542, 1545 (1994); see also Eric Gampel, Does
Professional Autonomy Protect Medical Futility Judgments?, 20 BIOETHICS 92, 97 (2006);
Pope, supra note 6, at 15.
71
See Pope, supra note 6, at 14–15.
72
See, e.g., Murray M. Pollack, Surrogate Decision Makers and Respect: Commentary on
“The Many Faces of Autonomy,” 3 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 303, 303–304 (1992); Benjamin
Weiser, A Question of Letting Go; Child’s Trauma Drives Doctors to Reexamine Ethical Role
Series: The Case of Baby Rena Series Number: 1/2, WASH. POST, July 14, 1991, at A1
[hereinafter Weiser Part I]; Benjamin Weiser, While Child Suffered, Beliefs Clashed
Series: The Case of Baby Rena: Who Decides When Care Is Futile? Series Number: 2/2,
WASH. POST, July 15, 1991, at A1 [hereinafter Weiser Part II].
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Weiser Part I, supra note 72, at A1.
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breathe, and had to be constantly sedated due to her expressions
of pain.74 A Christian couple who intended to foster Baby Rena
remained hopeful in the face of her failing health, and were
adamant that her care “be motivated by a spiritual sense of
obedience to God.”75 The treating doctor contended that the
prognosis was grim and the ventilator be removed.76 Despite
initial successes breathing on her own, Baby Rena ultimately
died on a ventilator after receiving cardio-pulmonary
resuscitation.77 The intended foster mother was “stunned,” as her
faith held that health was there for anyone who would just claim
it through prayer.78
Since the popularized case of Baby Rena, the appeals for
miraculous medical interventions have not subsided. The family
of Bobbi Kristina Brown, daughter of Bobbi Brown and Whitney
Houston, “asked friends and fans to pray for a miracle” in early
2015 after she nearly drowned in a bathtub and was rendered
unconscious.79 In the popular press, the 2013 case of Jahi
McMath presents another tragic standoff between surrogates and
hospital staff.80 Jahi was an Oakland teenager who went into
cardiac arrest after a routine tonsillectomy to alleviate sleep
apnea.81 After being placed on a ventilator, the hospital staff
declared the patient brain dead and suggested that the artificial
support be withdrawn.82 Jahi’s mother insisted that as long as
Jahi was on a ventilator and her heart was beating, God could
work a miracle.83 Unlike the Baby Rena case, this conflict
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Id.
David M. Smolin, Praying for Baby Rena: Religious Liberty, Medical Futility, and
Miracles, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 960, 964–65 (1995) (quoting Weiser Part I, supra
note 40, at A1).
76
Weiser Part II, supra note 72, at A1.
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Smolin, supra note 75, at 966.
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Id.
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Kent Sepkowitz, For Bobbi Kristina Brown, Science and the Miraculous Don’t Have to Be
at Odds, DAILY BEAST (Feb. 11, 2015),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/02/11/for-bobbi-kristina-brownscience-and-the-miraculous-don-t-have-to-be-atodds.html?via=newsletter&source=DDAfternoon.
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Family Continues Legal Battle to Have Brain-Dead Girl Declared Alive, CBS NEWS (Dec.
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actually went before a judge.84 The judge ruled that the ventilator
could be withdrawn if Jahi’s family could not find an alternative
facility that would provide her care.85 Jahi’s family received
permission to remove Jahi from Oakland Children’s Hospital,
and as of December of 2015, Jahi’s family was still caring for her
in a “home environment” in New Jersey.86 Jahi has remained on
a ventilator for the last two years with no reported signs of
improvement.87
These cases represent very private moments that became
heartbreaking public spectacles. But much more often, these endof-life decisions are made by families and providers in the
shadow of the media or courtrooms. The cases are not always so
clear-cut, where the medical consensus is that the patient is braindead and care is absolutely futile. Sometimes, the medical team
disagrees about whether the patient would survive withdrawal of
mechanical ventilation, and whether she might eventually regain
function that would be acceptable to her. While Baby Rena and
Jahi’s cases challenged futility standards on moral and religious
grounds, the word futility may be challenged as well on scientific
and empirical grounds. The term itself is a vexing one, but rather
than stumble on its imprecision, I will employ it here to mean
that additional care is contrary to acceptable standards of care as
there is likely no meaningful benefit to the patient. This is an
imperfect and fuzzy standard, but in many cases a workable one.
To address the very problem of families requesting that
“everything be done,”88 when the provider thinks that this care is
medically inappropriate, the majority of states have passed
medical futility statutes.89 The typical medical futility statute
prescribes either specific procedures or standards of conduct, and
essentially provide immunity from civil or criminal liability for
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Sergio Quintata, Family In Talks with Facilities to Move Jahi McMath, ABC NEWS
(Dec. 19, 2013), http://abc7news.com/archive/9374667/.
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Family Continues Legal Battle to Have Brain-Dead Girl Declared Alive, supra note 80.
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Id.
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See SCHNEIDERMAN ET AL., WRONG MEDICINE: DOCTORS, PATIENTS, AND FUTILE
TREATMENT 40 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press ed., 1995) (describing implications of
requests from patients and families seeking extreme treatments and calling for
responsive legislative reform).
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providers who follow the statute when withdrawing futile care.90
Some statutes do not specifically mention the term “futility,” and
instead just indicate that if a provider chooses for reasons of
“conscience” not to provide life-sustaining care, she can do so,
but must first satisfy certain requirements.91
The futility standard is fuzzy because it assumes that there
can be general agreement about prognosis. It is also fuzzy
because religions provide different guidance on principles such
as suffering, impermanence, the role of consciousness, and even
the definition of death, which inevitably confuses any clinical
standard of futility.92 Unfortunately, providers can never be
absolutely certain that care is medically ineffective or futile, as
patients rarely present in textbook ways. This uncertainty can
lead to ambiguity in end-of-life care decision-making. An
ideological tug-of-war may take hold between lifeconservationists and resource-conservationists, or in other
words, between the sympathetic providers and religious family
members on one end, and providers who think resources are
being wasted, or that the team is complicit in torture, on the
other. While appeals to miracles are frequent, particularly on
television, their occurrence is not.93 Even if prognosticating is
imperfect, there is usually agreement between physicians as to
whether the care is futile. But even when the medical team and
ethics committee are in agreement that the care is futile, the
question looms large: how much time, if any, do we give the
patient (and her family) to allow their God to intervene and
perform a miracle?
Skeptical providers ask whether God needs a ventilator
to perform his miracles, and why he might perform miracles for
90

Id. at 58.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2a-115 (West 2016).
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Mohamed Y. Rady & Joseph L. Verheidje, The Determination of Quality of Life and
Medical Futility in Disorders of Consciousness: Reinterpreting the Moral Code of Islam, 15
AM. J. BIOETHICS 14, 14 (2015) (discussing the effects of Islamic bioethics and
principles of Westernization on determinations about medical futility); Tuck Wai
Chan & Desley Hegney, Buddhism and Medical Futility, J. BIOETHICAL INQUIRY 434,
434 (2012) (explaining Buddhist ethical and religious implications of medical
futility).
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Susan Diem et al., Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation on Television: Miracles and
Misinformation, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1578, 1580 (1996) (“The portrayal of miracles
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some devoted patients but not others.94 Believers in miracles
focus instead on whether it is right to limit God’s potential to
intervene by withdrawing life support prematurely, especially
when the body is still warm and the heart is beating.95 Either
way, the two groups are talking past each other, as they employ
different meanings of the words “miracle” and “futility” and
certainly put different emphases on the cost of getting the
decision wrong.
This paper will spend a good deal of time engaging with
the constitutional and statutory requirements in this situation. Is
there a legal requirement to provide ventilator support
indefinitely while a family waits for a religious miracle? Even if
the physician is protected from a complaint of medical
malpractice, can the provider unilaterally withdraw support
without violating religious free exercise?96
II. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE FOR WITHDRAWING CARE WHEN
FAMILIES PRAY FOR A MIRACLE
Physicians overestimate the risk of being sued and this
guides their day-to-day practice.97 Even if the actual risk is low,
the menacing specter of a lawsuit is very real, with its reputationcrushing and time-sucking gravity. Many providers report that
the fear of liability is a chief reason they would give special
consideration to a religious request for futile care.98 Avoiding a
lawsuit becomes paramount, even if professional ethics and
justice warrant the cessation of aggressive treatments. Whether
94

See generally Teneille Brown, Accommodating Miracles (Jan. 23, 2017)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the First Amendment Law Review)
[hereinafter Brown II].
95
Id.
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The withdrawal is almost never truly unilateral, as the clinical team consults
repeatedly with family, social workers, and others before aggressively advocating for
removal of futile treatments. Even so, the term reflects that the provider may
terminate treatments when the patient does not consent. See Cheryl J. Misak,
Douglas B. White & Robert D. Truog, Medical Futility: A New Look at an Old Problem,
146 CHEST 1667, 1668 (2014) (reframing the futility discussion from the typical lens
of a unilateral withdrawal, and instead suggesting that “[m]edical decisions are never
made unilaterally . . . [but] are made in the context of an implicit and evolving social
contract among patients, physicians, and societies at large.”).
97
Barbara Phillips-Bute, Transparency and Disclosure of Medical Errors: It's the Right
Thing to Do, So Why the Reluctance?, 35 CAMPBELL L. REV. 333, 336 (2013); Emily
Carrier et al, Physicians’ Fears of Malpractice Lawsuits Are Not Assuaged by Tort Reforms,
29 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1585, 1585 (2010).
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defensive medicine is practiced out of fear of an actual lawsuit or
just a visit from their General Counsel’s office with an
institutional reprimand, most providers want nothing to do with
lawyers or their unwelcome questions.
And it is not as if the physicians’ fears of litigation are
baseless. There are several ways that patients or their family
members might legally challenge a provider’s unilateral decision
to withdraw futile life-sustaining measures. The most obvious
suit would allege that the providers’ withdrawal of the ventilator
or refusal to perform cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (or any
other treatment) violates the professional standard of care. This
could give rise to a civil tort suit for negligence against the
provider (i.e., medical malpractice). Although most conflicts are
resolved by giving patients a little, though not an indefinite,
amount of time, some families persist in their denial about their
loved one’s likely recovery and insist on futile care.99
The medical futility statutes described above were
enacted to prevent this sort of scenario and offer peace of mind
to physicians invoking futility. However, if the statute predicates
the legal safe harbor on practicing according to the standard of
care and in good faith, then this standard resembles an ordinary
negligence case.100 Put another way, the patient’s family would
argue that the medical futility statute does not shield the provider
from tort liability because the withdrawal of care was not
supported by good clinical judgment, or was not done in good
faith, according to the existing professional standard. As
Thaddeus Pope has argued, uncertainty over how juries would
define the professional standard of care renders hollow the
protection that medical futility statutes attempt to provide.101
However, the particular statutory immunity in cases of medical
futility does send a strong signal to physicians that if the standard
of care is not to provide treatment, they should be protected from
a negligence claim.
Notably, malpractice tort suits are different from suits for
temporary injunctions against the hospital. An immediate
motion for an injunction does not argue that a tort has occurred,
99
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but instead argues that a right will be imminently violated or
something inequitable will result if the hospital is not stopped
from withdrawing care right now. A tort suit, on the other hand,
would be decided when it is too late to reverse the withdrawal.
The plaintiff would just be compensated with money if she
prevails on her own, or on her loved one’s behalf.
The next type of liability could come by way of the
criminal law. While providers may fear criminal liability, this is
exceedingly unlikely.102 There is no state that criminally prohibits
a provider from withdrawing care that is deemed medically
ineffective or futile. It does not meet the criminal definition of a
battery. It is not murder. It is not criminal neglect. As long as the
providers are honest with the family about why they are
withdrawing the care, there is no fraud. These types of lawsuits
also would arise too late to enjoin the withdrawal of the care.
While the fear of tort or criminal liability poses risks to providers,
and will impact their decisions to unilaterally withdraw care, I
will not be addressing these types of suits here.
A second type of claim would involve the surrogates
suing for constitutional due process violations. Here, the family
could assert that the (a) public hospital’s policy of unilaterally
withdrawing treatment, or (b) the medical futility statute itself
violates their procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment.103 This might have some success if the statute does
not allow for fair and advanced notice to the patient and a
judicial hearing.104 The most process-oriented medical futility
statute that was passed by Texas, the Texas Advance Directive
Act (TADA), offers immunity from a civil or criminal lawsuit if
the facility treating the patient follows specific notification,
consultation, and documentation requirements.105 The
Children’s Hospital of Boston has adopted an institutional policy
that resembles the TADA.106
102

Id. at 49 (“Unilateral decisions to stop LSMT have thus led to homicide charges
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See Pope, supra note 6, at 76.
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Id.
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Specifically, under TADA, the provider must give the
surrogate forty-eight hours’ notice before holding a meeting of
the hospital’s ethics committee.107 The ethics committee then
reviews the provider’s determination that the care is futile. 108 If
the committee finds that the disputed treatment is medically
inappropriate, the surrogate is given the committee’s written
decision, which is final and not appealable in any court. 109 The
patient or surrogate can request an extension from withdrawal
from a district or county court, which will be granted “only if the
court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there is a
reasonable expectation that a physician or health care facility
that will honor the patient's directive will be found if the time
extension is granted.”110 Conversely, under the Boston
Children’s policy, the hospital must “inform [the surrogate] of
their legal right to seek a court order to block the hospital from
taking this action.”111
Under TADA, the provider is required to continue
providing the disputed care for 10 days,112 and during this time
the provider must make reasonable efforts to transfer the patient
to another provider that will comply with the surrogate’s
requests.113 If the transfer cannot be made, then the provider may
unilaterally withdraw treatment, even life-sustaining treatment,
on the eleventh day.114 The TADA therefore gives a great deal
of authority to the hospital ethics committee. This absolute
deference is procedurally suspect given that the majority of
members are likely employed by one of the parties to the conflict
(the hospital) and are on a first-name basis with the providers.115
107
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The TADA, and laws like it, may very well be unconstitutional
as a deprivation of a liberty interest without due process, as the
required hearing may be inadequate and the decision-maker is
not impartial.116
A substantive due process claim could be brought against
any state actor who relied on a state law to deprive a patient of a
fundamental liberty interest.117 Compared to the procedural due
process claim, the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due
process claim is less likely to be successful. Following Washington
v. Glucksberg,118 whichever “careful description” of the liberty
interest one employs—whether it be to require a provider to
continue care while the family prays for a religious miracle or to
give families time to wait for a miracle in medical treatments—
this liberty interest would not be found to be “deeply rooted in
the history and tradition” of our nation.119 Because the ability to
sustain life through the use of technologically advanced
equipment did not exist in our country’s early history, there is no
case law support for the idea that demanding its use while a
family prays for a miracle would be a fundamental liberty
interest. Even if it were considered a fundamental liberty
116

See Nora O'Callaghan, Dying for Due Process: The Unconstitutional Medical Futility
Provision of the Texas Advance Directives Act, 60 BAYLOR L. REV. 527, 585–89 (2008).
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discussed.” See Jerry H. Elmer, Physician-Assisted Suicide Controversy at the Intersection
of Law and Medicine, 46 R.I. BAR J. 13, 24 (1998).
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(quoting Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); then quoting Palko v.
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interest, it could be infringed by the state with compelling
interests that are narrowly tailored.120 This strict scrutiny is
similar to that found under the state and federal Religious
Freedom Restoration Acts, and I will analyze this test
thoroughly in section [x].
Despite the interesting questions these tort, criminal, and
Fourteenth Amendment analyses pose, I have a fourth type of
claim in my crosshairs. As I mentioned in the introduction, there
is something about the religious request for futile care that makes
providers more fastidious. They are particularly concerned about
treading lightly on patients’ religious freedoms, perhaps even
more concerned than they are about deviating from the medical
standard of care.121 I am therefore exploring in this article
whether the provider or hospital is violating the patient’s free
exercise rights under the First Amendment, or their rights under
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of their state. I will
evaluate why patients or their family members might make such
a religious freedom claim, and its likelihood of success. I will
analyze relevant case law developments related to religious
exemptions for free exercise to determine whether there might be
a violation of the patient’s religious free exercise rights when
providers unilaterally withdraw treatment. This liability would
not attach to individual providers, and would be directed at the
constitutionality of state laws and state institutional policies. I
will also ask whether the federal or state Religious Freedom
Restoration Acts (RFRAs) might provide an avenue for
successful legal action.
A. Unilateral Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Care Would Not Violate
the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause

120

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871
(1992).
121
Curlin et al., supra note 2, at 129 (“[P]rofessional attention to patients’ religious
and spiritual concerns is one part of a broader movement toward a more patientcentered, culturally competent, narrative, and holistic medicine. This movement
emphasizes the notion that patients interact with the health care system from a
specific language, culture, community, and tradition, all of which shape patients’
decisions and experiences related to illness.”).
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The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states,
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”122 The first part
of this is called the “Establishment Clause,” and prohibits state
endorsement of religion.123 The second focuses on being free
from government restraint to express religious beliefs and
practices.124 Historically, free exercise of religion was the right to
act publicly on the choices of religious conscience.125 James
Madison wrote that religious practices must be protected from
government interference because they are inseparable from
religious beliefs, as religion consists of both “the duties that we
owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging them.”126
However, as we will see, there is a “wide range of alternative
content for the first amendment's free exercise clause” and
history, case law, and language have “left the clause open for
widely disparate interpretation.”127
Because many private actions could be swept up under
the heading of religious exercise, its protection has never been
unrestricted. While nearly every early state constitution
guaranteed religious free exercise rights to some degree, they
often specified that such exercise “not violate the public peace or
the private rights of others.”128 The early states usually narrowed
their guarantee to “the free exercise of religious worship,” which
meant that the protection of indirect forms of religious
expression would need to be protected by other means, if at all.129
In the United States, despite our history of being founded on
religious freedom, states never went so far as to permit
“encroaching on the rights of others, disturbing the public peace,
or otherwise violating criminal laws” in order to protect it.130
122

U.S. CONST. amend I (emphasis added).
See id.
124
See id.
125
JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 45 (3d ed. 2011).
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Stephen Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 BYU L. REV. 299,
299–300 (1986).
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Witte, Jr. & Nichols, supra note 125, at 46.
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Id.
130
Luther Martin, For the Federal Gazette: No. V., FED GAZETTE & BALT. DAILY
ADVERTISER, Mar. 19, 1799, at 2 (“The declaration, that religious faith shall be
unpunished, does not give impunity to criminal acts, dictated by religious error.”).
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With a few exceptions, this is the philosophy of religious
freedom that has been endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court.131
This explains how a civil right could be inherently viewed in a
utilitarian framework, where the externalities of protecting
religious freedom have never been ignored.
But before we engage too deeply in this First Amendment
free exercise analysis, we need to explain exactly what form this
claim would make in the context of medical futility. Importantly,
only state actors can be found to violate the First Amendment,
as the Constitution only prohibits Congress from making any law
that would prohibit free exercise.132 This prohibition was
extended to state governments through the Fourteenth
Amendment, but does not reach private actors serving purely
private interests.133 Providers could be considered state actors if
they serve a public function, such as working at the Veteran’s
Affairs hospitals, a state prison, a county-run clinic, or a public,
state university hospital.
The state action needs to have deprived someone of a
constitutional right, which here would be the freedom of
religious exercise.134 In medical futility cases, the patient’s family
would be arguing for an accommodation of their religious belief,
through an exemption from the state or institution’s medical
futility law or policy. The patient’s family would argue that
complying with the policy would require a violation of the
patient’s religious beliefs of allowing God to act through prayer.
There are not very many Supreme Court cases that deal precisely
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Clark B. Lombardi, Nineteenth-Century Free Exercise Jurisprudence and the Challenge of
Polygamy: The Relevance of Nineteenth-Century Cases and Commentaries for Contemporary
Debates About Free Exercise Exemptions, 85 OR. L. REV. 374 (2006); Frederick Mark
Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate:
An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 343
(2014).
132
Michael L. Wells, Identifying State Actors in Constitutional Litigation: Reviving the Role
of Substantive Context, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 99 (2004).
133
In West v. Atkins, the Supreme Court held that a private physician under contract
with the state to provide medical services at a state hospital is acting as a state actor
for purposes of § 1983, a federal statute that allows plaintiffs to sue private
individuals for civil rights violations. See 487 U.S. 42, 57 (1988).
134
“Every exercise of judicial review should begin by identifying a governmental
actor, a constitutional subject. And every constitutional holding should start by saying
who has violated the Constitution.” Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the
Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 1214 (2010) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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with religious freedom exemptions from a state or federal law,
but these are the cases I will canvass.
Before determining that the patient should receive an
exemption from a medical futility law, a court must first
determine, as a threshold and definitional matter, whether the
belief at issue is religious.135 Then it must determine whether the
belief is sincerely held.136 In theory, the First Amendment does
not allow questioning the empirical basis for the religious belief,
but in practice, courts may dismiss First Amendment claims that
are incredulous under either of these prongs.137 In United States v.
Ballard, the Court states that “[m]en may believe what they
cannot prove. They may not be put to proof of their religious
doctrines or beliefs.”138 This means that even if a patient believes
something unorthodox, while the sincerity of the belief may be
questioned, the underlying religious belief cannot, so long as it
passes the threshold test of stemming from a “religion.”139
This broad deference to whether the belief is religious is
true even if a patient’s beliefs are different from the beliefs of her
co-members.140 If a Muslim family believes in a type of
miraculous religious intervention that would not be shared by
most Muslims, this does not invalidate the First Amendment
religious protection. The Court has reasoned that “it is not within
135

“We refused to evaluate the objective reasonableness of the prisoner's belief,
holding that our ‘scrutiny extends only to whether a claimant sincerely holds a
particular belief and whether the belief is religious in nature.’ Ford v. McGinnis, 352
F.3d 582, 590 (2d Cir. 2003); see also, Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly,
309 F.3d 144, 171 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 942.
136
William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 308, 310–11 (1991); see Kori Termine, Ford v. McGinnis: Should Courts Really
Enter the Thicket of Theology? 24 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 187, 194 (2005).
137
“A court is more likely to find against a claimant on definitional grounds when
the religion is bizarre, relative to the cultural norm, and is more likely to find that a
religious belief is insincere when the belief in question is, by cultural norms,
incredulous. The religious claims most likely to be recognized, therefore, are those
that closely parallel or directly relate to the culture's predominant religious
traditions.” Marshall, supra note 137, at 311 (footnote omitted).
138
322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944).
139
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339–40 (1970) (adopting broad definition of
“religion” under draft exemption statutes, but also influenced by constitutional
concerns); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965); Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of
Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 n.2 (1989) (noting that religious claims must be
deemed genuine unless it is patently “bizarre or incredible”); Lyng v. Nw. Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 457–58 (1988) (rejecting inquiry into
“centrality” of belief or practice on ground that it involves second-guessing believer's
understanding of his religion).
140
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981).
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the judicial function and judicial competence to inquire whether
the petitioner or his fellow worker more correctly perceived the
commands of their common faith. Courts are not arbiters of
scriptural interpretation.”141 Thus, for First Amendment
purposes, it is irrelevant whether one Episcopalian holds beliefs
about miracles that are not shared with other Episcopalians.
Importantly, the free exercise of “religion” need not be
limited to obeying mandatory rules set down by a church.
Although respected First Amendment scholar Doug Laycock
recognizes that the rights implicated in free exercise are “at a
maximum when government prohibits what faith
unambiguously requires, or requires what faith prohibits,”142 he
and others argue that the Free Exercise Clause must protect more
than this.143 The practice of religion encompasses more than
following edicts, because otherwise it would fail to protect most
religiously motivated practice. The ability to pray at a given
location or be a member of the ministry are not requirements of
each member of a faith, but they flow from religious belief. Thus,
despite lower court rulings to the contrary, if a state law or
regulation placed a substantial burden on the ability to pray, this
would likely be considered a substantial burden on religious free
exercise by the Supreme Court.144
Despite this broad deference to how an individual
conceives of her religious belief and religiously motivated
conduct, the cases based on free exercise have generally not
turned out favorably for people claiming that their rights have
been violated.145 As Ira Lupu points out, “[o]n rare occasions,
application of these standards has produced important victories
for religious freedom. Far more frequently, however, judges have
141

Id. at 716.
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, VOLUME 2: THE FREE EXERCISE
CLAUSE 95 (John Witte Jr. ed., 2011).
143
Frederick M. Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group
Rights, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 99, 142–44 (1989).
144
But see Brandon v. Board of Education, 635 F.2d 971, 977 (2d Cir. 1980); Chess v.
Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 917 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
145
While this dataset includes claims under the free exercise clause as well as RFRA
and religiously motivated free speech claims, the plaintiffs’ success rate by two
researchers was found to be 35.5%. Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Free Exercise of
Religion Before the Bench: Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts, 88 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1371, 1387–88 (2013).
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displayed pseudo-sensitivity to religious freedom.”146 The next
part of this article will investigate the development of the
Supreme Court Free Exercise jurisprudence and how it supports
this assertion.
B. The Development of Free Exercise Jurisprudence
In 1878, the Court decided Reynolds v. United States, the
first free exercise case.147 George Reynolds was a member of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Mormons) who
took a second wife and was charged under a criminal antibigamy statute.148 George challenged the criminal statute on free
exercise grounds.149 The Reynolds Court held that bigamy could
be considered a crime even though Mormons argued it was part
of their religious rights, or even duties.150 In this landmark free
exercise case, the Court reasoned that the First Amendment
protects religious belief but does not allow exemption from
otherwise valid laws based on these religious beliefs.151 To permit
an exemption for Reynolds “would be to make the professed
doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and
in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”152
In so holding that the criminal anti-bigamy statute was valid, the
Court said that “while [laws] cannot interfere with mere religious
belief and opinions, they may with practices.”153 This created a
categorical prohibition on exemptions from generally applicable
laws (i.e., laws that applied to religious and non-religious
conduct alike). Reynolds has never been explicitly overruled, but
its application has been limited.154 For one, the distinction
between religious belief and conduct that the Reynolds Court
146

Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 35, 39 (2015).
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98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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Id. at 146.
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Id. at 162.
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Id. at 168.
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Id.
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Id. at 167.
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Id. at 166.
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“Reynolds, despite its age, has never been overruled by the United States Supreme
Court and, in fact, has been cited by the Court with approval in several modern free
exercise cases, signaling its continuing vitality.” State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31, ¶ 51
(2006); and for the limitations on the Reynolds’ holding, see, Brown v. Buhman, 947
F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1187 (D. Utah 2013), vacated, 822 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2016).
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endorsed has been disavowed.155 The clause currently protects
religious conduct as well as religious belief.156 However, the
general principle disfavoring exemptions from otherwise valid
and generally applicable laws remains.157
The Court made a rhetorical shift in 1961 from
categorical prohibitions on exemption for generally applicable
laws. Instead of categorically prohibiting them, the Court now
discussed, and found relevant, the burdens imposed on the
religious believer. In Braunfeld v. Brown,158 Jewish shopkeepers
argued for an exemption from enforcement of a Pennsylvania
criminal statute, which prohibited shops from being open on
Sundays.159 The shopkeepers lost, but the Court nevertheless
inquired into the burdens that would be imposed on religious
practice by having to work on their Jewish Sabbath in order to
stay competitive and comply with mandatory closures on the
Christian Sabbath.160 The Court also asked whether the
legislature could draft alternative means of achieving the same
legislative goals.161 Even though the religious exercise claim
failed, this was an important rhetorical shift to consider the
burdens of complying with a generally applicable law.
Two years later, the Supreme Court's decision in Sherbert
v. Verner162 built upon the language from Braunfeld. In Sherbert, a
Seventh-day Adventist Church member was denied
155

“In deciding the [Yoder] case in favor of the Amish parents, the Court also
rejected the state's asserted distinction between regulation of ‘beliefs’ and regulation
of ‘conduct.’ The Court stated that in cases of this sort, ‘belief and action cannot be
neatly confined in logic-tight compartments.’” See Paula A. Monopoli, Allocating the
Costs of Parental Free Exercise: Striking a New Balance Between Sincere Religious Belief and a
Child's Right to Medical Treatment, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 319, 339 (1991).
156
Kristen A. Berberick, Marrying into Heaven: The Constitutionality of Polygamy Bans
Under the Free Exercise Clause, 44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 105, 115–16 (2007).
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Smith, 494 U.S. 872
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366 U.S. 599 (1961).
159
Id. at 601–02 (“Appellants contend that the enforcement against them of the
Pennsylvania statute will prohibit the free exercise of their religion because, due to
the statute's compulsion to close on Sunday, appellants will suffer substantial
economic loss, to the benefit of their non-Sabbatarian competitors, if appellants also
continue their Sabbath observance by closing their businesses on Saturday. . .”).
160
Id. at 608–09.
161
Id. at 603 (“Concededly, appellants and all other persons who wish to work on
Sunday will be burdened economically by the State's day of rest mandate . . . ”); id. at
608 (“[W]e examined several suggested alternative means by which it was argued
that the State might accomplish its secular goals without even remotely or
incidentally affecting religious freedom.”).
162
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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unemployment benefits because she refused to accept available
employment that required her to work on Saturday, the day of
her Sabbath.163 In administrative proceedings under the
unemployment benefits statute, the tribunal found that the
restriction upon her availability for Saturday work brought her
within the provision disqualifying for benefits, because she
failed, without good cause, to accept “suitable work when
offered . . . by the employment office or the employer . . . .”164
Here, the Supreme Court upheld her free exercise claim by
applying strict scrutiny, a framework born of the First
Amendment speech protections but maturing in other
doctrines.165
Specifically in Sherbert, the Court asked whether the
generally applicable and facially neutral unemployment
regulations imposed a burden on the free exercise of the
appellant’s religion, and whether the regulations were necessary
to satisfy a compelling state interest.166 As to the first
requirement, the Court easily found that the law burdened her
religious exercise.167 The Court stated that the benefits ruling
“force[d] her to choose between following the precepts of her
religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning
one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the
other hand.”168 It reasoned that the government imposing such a
choice burdens free exercise in the same way as fining her for
Saturday worship.169
Next, the Court asked whether the state’s regulations
were the least restrictive possible to further a compelling state
interest.170 The Court answered in the negative, saying that “even
if the possibility of spurious claims did threaten to dilute the
[unemployment] fund and disrupt the scheduling of [Saturday]
work, it would plainly be incumbent upon the appellees to
163

Id. at 399–400.
Id. at 401.
165
Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny,
48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355, 357 (2006).
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demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would
combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment
rights.”171 The appellees did not assert this interest before the
state court, and even if they had, they failed to demonstrate that
it was the least restrictive means possible.172
Addressing whether the state’s interests could have been
deemed compelling, had they been raised, the Court emphasized
that “[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount
interests” could justify burdening Sherbert’s religion.173 Seeing
no compelling asserted interests in denying benefits to Sherbert,
the Court held that the Free Exercise clause had been violated.174
Sherbert created a new constitutional standard for testing First
Amendment Free Exercise cases that employed the strict
scrutiny test from Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.175 That
is, Free Exercise cases now included an inquiry into the relative
religious burdens on the claimant, and whether the advanced
state interests in the law are compelling and the least restrictive
possible.176
For nearly three decades, the Court employed the Sherbert
test to free exercise claims in many different contexts. 177 It has
been said that during this time the Court was “too willing to
create exceptions to the doctrine, and lower courts were too
willing to find that free exercise rights were not burdened and
that governmental interests were compelling.”178 According to
Douglas Laycock, during this time courts routinely
underestimated the burdens imposed and overestimated the
importance of governmental interests.179 Even so, the test
remained and the Court continued to inquire into the religious
burdens imposed by religiously neutral laws.180 The next
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landmark case to employ Sherbert was Wisconsin v. Yoder, decided
in 1972.181
In Yoder, members of the Amish religion were convicted
of violating Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law.182
Instead of attending school until the age of sixteen, as the law
required, the Amish provided their own vocational education
after the eighth grade.183
The Court in Yoder held that the Free Exercise Clause
relieved adult members of the “Old Order Amish” from the
obligation to send their children to school until the age of
sixteen.184 The Court argued that respondents have amply
supported their claim “that enforcement of the compulsory
formal education requirement after the eighth grade would
gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of their religious
beliefs.”185 Complying with Wisconsin’s law would mean that
the members would receive not only the “censure of the church
community,” but would also “endanger their own salvation and
that of their children.”186 This presented a significant burden on
their religious free exercise.187
The Court also found that the state interest was not
compelling.188 This was not as applied generally to the state’s
interest in public education, but in the specific state interest in
requiring public education until the age of sixteen for the Amish
in this case.189 The Amish experts testified at trial, without
challenge, that a few extra years of compulsory education
may be necessary when its goal is the preparation
of the child for life in modern society as the
majority live, but it is quite another if the goal of
education be viewed as the preparation of the child
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for life in the separated agrarian community that
is the keystone of the Amish faith.190
Moreover, the Amish provided an “ideal vocational education
for their children in the adolescent years,” in case they should
choose to leave the faith.191
Like Sherbert, Yoder also used the language of “burdening”
the believers and requiring “compelling” state interests, and
seems to perform a cost-benefit analysis that stacks up the net
benefits and burdens to the claimants and the state.192 The Court
ruled in favor of the Amish, but only after a thorough assessment
of the impact of the exemption on the state and the religious
believers.193 Notably, the Court seemed impressed by the
historical roots of the Amish people’s religious requests, and the
fact that this was a sincere and deeply held belief that was integral
to their religious faith.194 Future cases would challenge the
relevance of this finding of sincerity and centrality, but this dicta
raises interesting questions for medical futility cases that will be
discussed later in the article. Yoder remained the high-water mark
in terms of protecting religious liberties well into the 1980s. 195
After this case, the Supreme Court retreated, and there were very
few victories for Free Exercise claimants.196 Those who did
succeed demonstrated explicit discrimination against religion or
denials of unemployment compensation, as in Sherbert.197
190

Id. at 222.
Id. at 224.
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Id. at 229.
193
Id. at 236.
194
Id. at 205 (“Aided by a history of three centuries as an identifiable religious sect
and a long history as a successful and self-sufficient segment of American society, the
Amish have demonstrated the sincerity of their religious beliefs, the interrelationship
of belief with their mode of life, the vital role that belief and daily conduct play in the
continuing survival of Old Order Amish communities, and the hazards presented by
the State's enforcement of a statute generally valid as to others.”).
195
See Steven H. Aden & Lee J. Strang, When A "Rule" Doesn't Rule: The Failure of the
Oregon Employment Division v. Smith "Hybrid Rights Exception", 108 PENN ST. L. REV.
573, 577 (2003) (“Wisconsin v. Yoder was, in many ways, the high water mark of
free exercise mandated exemptions.”).
196
“While the Court continually rejected the claims of free exercise plaintiffs, it
continued to invoke the language of the compelling state interest test. It thus
appeared that the Supreme Court had settled on applying a watered-down version of
strict scrutiny in the area of free exercise.” See id. at 579.
197
Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Free Exercise of Religion After Smith and Boerne:
Charting a Middle Course, 68 MISS. L.J. 105 n.44 (1998); Daniel A. Crane, Beyond
RFRA: Free Exercise of Religion Comes of Age in the State Courts, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
235, 246 (1998) (“Putting aside the unemployment compensation cases, not since
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This then brings us to the case of Department of Human
Resources v. Smith.198 This case changed everything.199 In this
case, petitioners were fired from their jobs at a private drug
rehabilitation center for ingesting peyote for sacramental
purposes at a ceremony of their Native American church.200 They
sought review of the denial of their unemployment benefits,
claiming that their use of the hallucinogen peyote should not
have been considered criminal misconduct, making them
ineligible for benefits.201 Justice Scalia wrote the plurality
opinion, which found that their free exercise rights had not been
violated.202 The Court held that to grant an exemption from a
religiously-neutral law would place the employees “beyond the
reach of a criminal law that is not specifically directed at their
religious practice. . . .”203 Justice Scalia went on to say that the
collection of a general tax might offend the religious freedom of
those who do not believe in supporting organized government,
but they would still be required to pay the tax.204 If burdening
religion “is not the object of the tax, but merely the incidental
effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the
First Amendment has not been offended.”205 Heretofore, indirect
burdens on religious practices that apply equally to the religious
and non-religious would not be considered violations of the First
Amendment’s free exercise clause.
The plurality opinion dismantled the Sherbert test, which
had required demonstrating that a law that substantially
burdened religion be the least restrictive necessary to fulfill a
compelling state interest. Justice Scalia noted that “[i]n recent
years we have abstained from applying the Sherbert test (outside
the unemployment compensation field) at all” and he then listed
many different cases where the Court did not require the
Yoder had the Supreme Court required an exemption from a generally applicable law
on free exercise grounds.”).
198
Emp’t Div., Dep’t. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
199
See Aden & Strang, supra note 195.
200
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201
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202
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government to advance a compelling state interest.206 The Court
therefore argued that even if they were to apply it to the present
case, they would not use it to require a religious exemption from
an otherwise neutral and generally applicable law.207 In strong
terms, the Court stated that it has “never held that an individual's
religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise
valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.”208
The scrutinizing framework of Sherbert and Yoder were being
completely undone.
1. Applying Current First Amendment Free Exercise
Precedent to Medical Futility Statutes
So long as Smith holds, it is exceedingly unlikely that
existing medical futility statutes could be found to violate a
patient’s First Amendment Free Exercise of religion. While not
technically required by any religious faith, belief in the power of
prayer to heal the sick is motivated by religion and the free
exercise protections ought to apply. The threshold finding that
the statutes impact the practice of religion should be met. Courts
might disagree on whether the statutes place a substantial burden
on religion. Because this component mirrors the analysis under
the federal and state Religious Freedom Restoration Acts
(RFRA), this prong will be examined in the next subsection of
the Article.
Smith holds that for First Amendment purposes, a
generally applicable law will not violate free exercise if it is at
least related to legitimate government interests.209 The unilateral
withdrawal of futile treatment that is permitted under the futility
statutes applies generally to religious patients and non-religious
patients alike.210 The medical futility statutes are thus neutral
206

Id. at 883–84.
“Even if we were inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life beyond the
unemployment compensation field, we would not apply it to require exemptions
from a generally applicable criminal law.” Id. at 884, superseded by statute, Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (November
16, 1993), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb through 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-4.
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laws that do not mention religious beliefs as a basis for
withdrawal or continuance of care. While some requests for
futile care might be religiously motivated, many requests have
nothing to do with religion at all. And as Smith declared, even if
the religiously-neutral medical futility statutes incidentally
burden the exercise of religion, these will not be invalidated
under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. Prior to
Smith, the relative burdens on religion and benefits to the state
would need to be assessed for First Amendment purposes.211 The
state would have had to show that its interests in passing the
medical futility statutes were compelling.212 After Smith,
however, the challenge is much easier to overcome. The
generally applicable and facially neutral medical futility statutes
would not be considered unconstitutional.
However, as much of the preceding case analysis
probably made clear, in a medical futility case the plaintiffs’
claims would be even weaker than for those decided by the
Supreme Court in the past. In Smith, Yoder, and Braunfeld, the
plaintiffs were not arguing that they should be able to require
some third party to act. Rather, they were arguing that they
should be exempt from legal sanctions for acting (or not acting)
themselves. This is a very important difference, which spells
unlikely success for a religious patient praying for a miracle.
In the case of a challenge to a medical futility statute, the
religious challengers would be seeking medically futile care,
which would require the conscription of objecting hospital staff
who may or may not be state actors, as well as the use of
insurance resources to cover the oversight and use of the medical
equipment in a way that might violate the clinical standard of
care. Even under an analysis akin to that which the Sherbert or
Yoder court undertook, it is quite unlikely religious patients
would prevail given the moral and economic costs imposed on

ANN. § 41-41-215 (West 2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2H-62, 26:2H:65 (West 2016);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-7 (West 2016); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1808 (West
2016); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046 (West 2016); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 35-22-408 (West 2016).
211
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
212
Id. at 406.
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third-parties.213 As Frederick Gedicks and Rebecca G. Van
Tassel point out, permissive accommodations under the Free
Exercise Clause may violate the Establishment Clause when they
externalize the cost of protecting religious freedom to nonbelieving third-parties such as private hospitals and their staff.214
Unlike permissive religious accommodations that may be
allowed by patients or providers, the structural bars on
establishing religion cannot be waived by patients, providers, or
the hospital staff.215 Thus, to the extent that medical futility
statutes or policies carve out religious reasons for special
treatment to protect free exercise, the cost-shifting to nonbelieving third-parties (patients who do not receive ventilator
support because they are being used by religious patients, or
providers who morally object to providing this care) could then
violate the Establishment Clause.216
Additionally, the net burdens and benefits skew sharply
against the hospital and insurance company, making the
accommodation less permissible. The denial of extra time to wait
for a miracle may indirectly burden religious practice, but the
significance of this burden is hard to quantify. In a medical
futility case, the patient’s family is never prohibited from praying
for a miracle, they are just prohibited from requiring the providers
to perform certain tasks while they pray for a miracle.217 However,
if we are to give any independent content to the idea of a
“substantive burden,” the likelihood of the outcome of the
religious exercise must matter as well as the magnitude of what
213

Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 131, at 349 (“[T]he Court condemns permissive
accommodations on Establishment Clause grounds when the accommodations
impose significant burdens on third parties who do not believe or participate in the
accommodated practice.”).
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Id.
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Id. at 347 (“[T]he Establishment Clause is a structural bar on government action
rather than a guarantee of personal rights. Violations of the Establishment Clause
cannot be waived by the parties or balanced away by weightier private or
government interests, as can violations of the Free Exercise Clause.”).
216
See Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 132, at 357 (“[These] decisions demonstrate
the Court's general rejection of accommodations that shift the costs of
accommodating a religion from those who practice it to those who don’t.”).
217
For example, the Texas medical futility statute provides that “[t]he attending
physician, any other physician responsible for the care of the patient, and the health
care facility are not obligated to provide life-sustaining treatment after the 10th day
after both the written decision and the patient's medical record required under
Subsection (b) are provided to the patient or the person responsible for the health
care decisions of the patient” , but there is no mention of any prohibition on the
patient’s ability to pray during this procedure. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §
166.046 (West 2016).
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is lost by no accommodation. If hospitals recognized religious
exemptions for those demanding futile care, there may be no
limit to the requests. Hospitals would run out of space and
equipment. This would be exacerbated by the difficulty
discerning the sincere religious requests from the insincere, a
topic we will take up later in the Article.218
2. The Response to Smith – the Federal Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA)
Academics, politicians, religious leaders, and the media
were quick to condemn the Smith opinion.219 Three prominent
First Amendment scholars described the decision as a “sweeping
disaster for religious liberty” while Congressman Stephen J.
Solarz declared that “the Supreme Court has virtually removed
religious freedom from the Bill of Rights.”220 Congress responded
to the Smith decision by passing the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) three years later in 1993.221 Supported
by a diverse coalition of members of Congress and signed into
law by President Clinton, RFRA reintroduced the compelling
interest test as a statutory right.222 More precisely, the goal of
RFRA was to prevent governments at all levels (local, state, and
federal) from substantially burdening Free Exercise rights with
generally applicable laws unless the government satisfied strict
scrutiny, that is, the law was the least restrictive possible to
further a compelling state interest.223
218

Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1, 41 (1994) (“In a few cases, however, a
claimed exemption, though tolerable on its own, raises a strong risk of bringing on
many others, and so poses ‘a substantial threat to public safety or order . . .
sometimes granting an exemption will produce ‘an administrative problem of such
magnitude’ as to ‘render the entire statutory scheme unworkable.’. . . The threat of
cumulative exemptions comes not only from other sincere religious objectors, but
from other persons who could feign the same objection to get the benefits of
exemption. The First Amendment itself hampers the government in uncovering such
‘strategic behavior,’ because the government cannot adopt too narrow a definition of
what beliefs or practices are ‘religious’ or inquire too closely into their sincerity or
their importance to the believer.”).
219
See James E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic
Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407 (1992) (“Members of the media, academics,
members of Congress, and religious interest groups greeted the decision with
condemnation and despair.”).
220
Id. at 1409–10.
221
Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Free Exercise of Religion Before the Bench:
Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1371, 1373 (2013).
222
Id.
223
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-1 (West 2016).
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Through RFRA, Congress sought to undo the
consequences of the Court's Smith decision and restore a
statutory standard that was more protective of religious
freedom.224 Though many others have advanced this argument,
the fact that RFRA was never successfully challenged on
Establishment Clause grounds is perplexing.225 However, the
Supreme Court has interpreted the statute and has not deemed it
unconstitutional, at least as applied to federal government
action.226 In fact, in Gonzales v. O Centro, the Supreme Court
validated a “focused” read of RFRA that heightened the burden
on the federal government.227
The Supreme Court did find that RFRA had overstepped
its bounds as it applied to the states. In City of Boerne v. Flores, the
Court announced that Congress exceeded its Fourteenth
Amendment authority by enacting legislation designed to
enforce the Free Exercise Clause against the states.228 In so
doing, the Court declared that RFRA cannot be applied to the
states.229 However, while it left undecided whether RFRA is also
unconstitutional at the federal level, subsequent case law has
apparently decided this in the negative.230
The Boerne case has a significant impact on Free Exercise
claims, as only a fraction of laws that burden religious exercise
224

Heise & Sisk, supra note 221, at 1373.
Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act Is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 453 (1994) (“Supreme
Court decisions make clear that the constitutional power to accommodate religious
practice does not license the state to confer privileges upon religious believers
indiscriminately.”); see Scott C. Idleman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act:
Pushing the Limits of Legislative Power, 73 TEX. L. REV. 247, 285–86 (1994); see also
Frederick Mark Gedicks & Andrew Koppelman, Invisible Women: Why an Exemption
for Hobby Lobby Would Violate the Establishment Clause, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 51,
54 (2014).
226
See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014).
227
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 419–
20 (2006) (“[T]he Government [must] demonstrate that the compelling interest test is
satisfied through application of the challenged law ‘to the person’—the particular
claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.”).
228
521 U.S. 507, 508 (1997) (“Although Congress certainly can enact legislation
enforcing the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion . . . its §5 power ‘to
enforce’ is only preventive or ‘remedial,’ . . . . The Amendment's design and § 5's text
are inconsistent with any suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the
substance of the Amendment's restrictions on the States.”) (citations omitted).
229
Id. at 534–535.
230
Aurora R. Bearse, RFRA: Is It Necessary? Is It Proper?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 1045,
1045 n.4 (1998).
225
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are federal ones. Most religious liberty disputes arise over state
and local laws.231 This is the case with medical futility statutes
and unilateral decisions to withdraw treatment. The statutes are
passed and implemented at the state level, and so the federal
RFRA would not apply. This puts a sharp halt to any federal
RFRA analysis.
a. The Response to Boerne—state RFRAs
In the aftermath of Boerne, RFRA supporters began
lobbying in their state capitals for state versions of the federal
law.232 Within just a few years, RFRA legislation had been
proposed in several states.233 Advocacy groups that were
traditionally considered at odds with one another came together
to marshal RFRA through state legislatures, and “[t]he results
generally rewarded their efforts.” 234
These state RFRAs have now been passed by 21 states
and Congress.235 The state acts are modeled on the federal law,
requiring strict scrutiny when a state law burdens the exercise of
religion.236 There are significant differences between states in
terms of the threshold burden on religion that is required and
whether there are areas where the law does not apply. Regardless
of the differences, however, the Smith case remains the
constitutional floor for protecting free exercise under the First
Amendment.237 States are allowed to create greater protections,
which most of the RFRAs do, but they cannot protect religious
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Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55
S.D. L. REV. 466, 467 (2010).
232
James A. Hanson, Missouri's Religious Freedom Restoration Act: A New Approach to
the Cause of Conscience, 69 MO. L. REV. 853, 856 (2004).
233
See Jason Goldman, Religious Freedom: Why States Are Unconstitutionally Burdening
Their Own Citizens As They "Lower" the Burden, 2015 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 57,
60–61 (2015).
234
Hanson, supra note 232, at 856.
235
See 2015 State Religious Freedom Restoration Legislation, NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
STATE LEGISLATORS, http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/2015state-rfra-legislation.aspx (“Seventeen states have introduced legislation this year
regarding the creation of, or alteration to, a state religious freedom law. Currently, 21
states have Religious Freedom Restoration Acts (RFRAs).”); see also 42 U.S.C. ch.
21B (West 2016) (Congress passed RFRA in 1993).
236
See Mark Strasser, Old Wine, Old Bottles, and Not Very New Corks: On State RFRAs
and Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 34 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 335, 358 (2015).
237
Lund, supra note 231, at 493.
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free exercise less than Smith (i.e., permitting intentional religious
discrimination).238
State courts have struggled to interpret state RFRAs.239
Quite puzzlingly, some state courts have equated the strict
scrutiny standard from their RFRA with the watered-down
scrutiny of Smith, and others have interpreted their RFRA to
provide less protection than Smith.240 Religious liberty claims
should be analyzed differently under the First Amendment’s
Free Exercise Clause and RFRA. This is because Supreme Court
jurisprudence controls Free Exercise claims, while statutory
interpretation applies to state RFRA claims.241 What the state
RFRAs have in common, however, is a requirement that the
burden on religion be motivated by compelling state interests, as
opposed to mere legitimate ones.
To invoke most state RFRAs, the plaintiff needs to show
that the governmental action placed a “substantial burden” on
the plaintiff's exercise of a sincere religious belief.242 If this
threshold requirement is not met, then no claim or defense is
available under many RFRAs.243 Because the state interest in the
law must only be narrowly tailored to further a compelling state
interest if religion is found to be burdened, the threshold
definition of “burden” under the state RFRAs is quite important.
Some states (such as Alabama, Connecticut, Florida,
Illinois, New Mexico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Texas)
have not included a statutory definition of “substantial burden”
in their RFRAs, leaving the courts to define this term. 244 Four
state legislatures provided their understanding of what the term
should mean.245 Arizona’s definition appears the broadest, as it
states “the term substantially burden is intended solely to ensure
238

See Michael D. Currie, Scrutiny Mutiny: Why the Iowa Supreme Court Should Reject
Employment Division v. Smith and Adopt A Strict Scrutiny Standard for Free-Exercise
Claims Arising Under the Iowa Constitution, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1363, 1377 (2014); see also
Lund, supra note 231, at 466.
239
Lund, supra note 231, at 485–86.
240
Id. at 486.
241
Hanson, supra note 232, at 857.
242
Lund, supra note 232, at 477.
243
Id.
244
James W. Wright, Jr., Making State Religious Freedom Restoration Amendments
Effective, 61 ALA. L. REV. 425, 433 (2010).
245
Id.
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that this article is not triggered by trivial, technical or de minimis
infractions.”246 Idaho and Oklahoma’s RFRAs state that to
substantially burden religious exercise is merely to “inhibit or
curtail religiously motivated practices.”247 Pennsylvania’s
statutory definition is the most detailed, and includes any act
that:
(1) Significantly constrains or inhibits conduct or
expression mandated by a person's sincerely held
religious beliefs.
(2) Significantly curtails a person's ability to
express adherence to the person's religious faith.
(3) Denies a person a reasonable opportunity to
engage in activities which are fundamental to the
person's religion.
(4) Compels conduct or expression which violates
a specific tenet of a person's religious faith.248
Now, let us apply this detailed definition to the medical
futility case at hand. One characterization of the burden could be
that state RFRA medical futility statutes impose no substantial
burden on religious exercise. At any point in the patient’s life, the
family can pray for a miracle. No state medical futility law
prohibits prayer. The question in these potential cases is whether
the family should be allowed to pray under a specific set of
conditions—namely, while the patient is being supported by
artificial life support. No Supreme Court or RFRA case supports
this expansive of a view of religious liberty, as this certainly
“encroaches” on the rights of others; namely, the rights of the
providers not to be required to provide futile care at the expense
of other patients who might need their services.249
246

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493.01(e) (West 2016).
Wright, Jr., supra note 244, at 434.
248
71 P.S. § 2403 (West 2016).
249
See Kathleen M. Boozang, Deciding the Fate of Religious Hospitals in the Emerging
Health Care Market, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 1429, 1481–1482 (1995) (“When initially
enacted, the Conscience Clauses protected recipients of federal funds and their staffs
from being required to participate in abortion or sterilization procedures that
conflicted with the providers' religious or moral beliefs. One year later, Congress
expanded the Conscience Clauses to permit a health care provider to refuse to
perform any health service or research that conflicts with personal religious or moral
beliefs.”); see also Lynn D. Wardle, Protecting the Rights of Conscience of Health Care
Providers, 14 J. OF LEGAL MED. 177, 177 (1993); see also 42 U.S.C. 300a-7(d) (2000).
247
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However, under a few state RFRAs, the denial of
additional time to pray for a miracle might meet the threshold
statutory definition of “burden.”250 Specifically, under Idaho or
Oklahoma’s RFRAs, the denial of life support while the patient
prays for a miracle could be said to “inhibit or curtail religiously
motivated practices,” such as praying for a miracle. Under
Arizona’s definition of a burden, the denial of life support while
the patient or his family prays for a miracle would also likely not
be considered a trivial infraction of religious free exercise, given
that these are often life and death situations of tremendous
spiritual and religious significance. In these states where it could
be found that the denial of futile treatment results in a burden of
religious exercise, the state would then need to demonstrate that
the medical futility laws are narrowly tailored to advance a
compelling state interest.251
b. Multiple Compelling State Interests Exist to Deny Religious
Exemptions from Medical Futility Laws
Although the states employ different thresholds for what
counts as a sufficient burden, each requires that the state advance
a compelling interest in the legislation.252 When determining
whether a state’s interest is compelling, the courts in most states
have said they look to First Amendment jurisprudence.253 Thus,
the compelling interest inquiry would resemble that under the
Smith and pre-Smith decisions, discussed above.
What is the compelling state interest in medical futility
laws? There are several state interests that would likely be
considered compelling, if the state or federal courts correctly
interpreted existing strict scrutiny standards from Sherbert and
other constitutional precedents. While “only those interests of
the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance
legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion[,]”254 the medical
futility statutes could rather easily clear this hurdle. The states’
250

See Goldman, supra note 233, at 69 (describing the different conceptions of
“burden” under state RFRAs).
251
Alan E. Brownstein, State RFRA Statutes and Freedom of Speech, 32 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 605, 627–28 (1999).
252
Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAS, 55
S.D. L. REV. 466, 478 (2010).
253
Id.
254
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).

86

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15

compelling interests in prohibiting religious exemptions from
medical futility statutes could be:
1) respecting provider autonomy,
2) respecting physician’s professional ethics and
integrity by blurring the line between healing and
harming,
3) not allowing professional standards of care to be
trumped by religious requests,
4) preserving scarce resources in the event of an epidemic
or other public health need,
5) the inability to distinguish the potentially abundant
religiously insincere from sincere claims, and/or
6) the need for some principled and generally-applicable
basis for terminating potentially indefinite life
support.
Any of these could satisfy strict scrutiny, and some already
have.255 For starters, both Congress and the Supreme Court have
recognized the need to protect the autonomy, religious beliefs,
and professional standards of health care providers.256 Physicians
should not be required to perform treatments that run afoul of
their conscience or professional ethics, just because a patient or
his family is requesting it.257
The Church Amendment, which was passed by Congress
in 1973, made clear that the receipt of federal Medicare funds
would not provide a basis for mandating a health care provider
“to perform or assist in the performance of any sterilization
procedure or abortion if his performance or assistance in the
performance of such procedure or abortion would be contrary to
255

See infra pp. 42–50.
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997); see also United States v.
Lachman, 48 F.3d at586, 592–593;93 (1st Cir. 1995); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 70
N.J. 10, 44 (1976) overruled by Matter of Conroy, 98 N.J. 321 (1985); Dennies
Varughese, Conscience Misbranded!: Introducing the Performer v. Facilitator Model for
Determining the Suitability of Including Pharmacists Within Conscience Clause Legislation,
79 TEMP. L. REV. 649, 659 (2006).
257
See Judith F. Daar, A Clash at the Bedside: Patient Autonomy v. A Physician's
Professional Conscience, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1241, 1260 (1993) (“While concern for a
physician compromising his or her own concept of professional integrity may seem
to have no place in the world of patient autonomy, in fact both courts and
legislatures have historically regarded a physician's comfort with his or her actions as
a high priority.”).
256
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his religious beliefs or moral convictions.”258 It also provided that
no “entity” could be compelled to “make its facilities available
for the performance of any sterilization procedure or abortion if
[such] performance . . . is prohibited by the entity on the basis of
religious beliefs or moral convictions.”259 The protection of a
physician’s rights of freedom of speech and freedom of religion
is “clearly a compelling state interest.”260 Many states then
enacted other healthcare refusal laws in the wake of the Church
Amendment.261 These laws did not just exempt providers from
performing abortions or sterilizations, but were expanded to
include contraceptive and other practices that the provider might
consider immoral.262 Medical futility statutes are just one type of
these laws.263
In the context of physician-assisted suicide and
reproductive rights, the Supreme Court has found that physicians
are unique, and the state has an interest in preserving their
professional ethics and maintaining a distinction between
physician’s duties to heal rather than harm.264 As evidenced by a
related survey I conducted and published elsewhere,265 providers
think administering futile treatment is unethical as they feel they
are potentially harming a patient through forced ventilation or
feeding without offering any clinical benefit.266 When a patient is
on a ventilator, or breathing machine, she cannot speak and is
heavily sedated so that the breathing is relaxed.267 This means
that the providers have to use indirect measures to assess
258

42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b)(1) (2012).
§ 300a-7(b)(2)(A).
260
Leora Eisenstadt, Separation of Church and Hospital: Strategies to Protect Pro-Choice
Physicians in Religiously Affiliated Hospitals, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 135, 167 (2003).
261
Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience
Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2538 (2015).
262
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264
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997) (“The State also has an
interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession. . . .
[P]hysician-assisted suicide could, it is argued, undermine the trust that is essential to
the doctor-patient relationship by blurring the time-honored line between healing and
harming.”).
265
Brown I, supra note 42.
266
Id.
267
What to Expect While on a Ventilator, NATIONAL HEART, LUNG, AND BLOOD
INSTITUTE (Feb. 2011), https://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/healthtopics/topics/vent/while; see also Judith Ann Tate et al., Anxiety and Agitation in
Mechanically Ventilated Patients, 22 QUALITATIVE HEALTH RESEARCH 157, 157 (2012).
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discomfort. They cannot ask the patient directly whether she is
in pain. In some cases, the patient might need to have her hands
tied down so that she does not regain consciousness and try to
pull the irritating breathing tube out of her mouth.268 Forcing
providers to administer medically ineffective treatment that
might cause great discomfort to the patient compromises the
professional ethics of the medical community, and blurs the line
between healing and harming. This provides a second
compelling state interest in denying a religious exemption to
medical futility laws.
Even the staunchest of religious freedom supporters
recognize that public health and safety concerns present
compelling state interests.269 During the last swine flu outbreak,
many public health authorities realized they needed to develop
guidelines on the proper rationing of ventilators in the event of
another flu epidemic.270 This was in response to hospitals being
at capacity with their ventilators, and states not having policies
in place for how to best allocate these scarce and expensive
resources.271 If religious patients could commandeer the use of
the ventilator indefinitely with First Amendment protection, this
could thwart public health efforts. This presents another robust
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Lorraine Mion et al., Patient-Initiated Device Removal in Intensive Care Units: A
National Prevalence Study, 35 CRITICAL CARE MED. 2714, 2715 (2007)
(“…maintenance of therapeutic devices is a primary reason for use of physical
restraints in ICUs.”).
269
James E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic
Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1442 (1992) (“The National Council of Churches…
have suggested that religious practices be restricted only when they threaten ‘public
health and safety.’”).
270
One problem identified by North Carolina’s department of health was that in the
event of a flu epidemic, there would not be enough ventilators: “During the worst
week of an extreme global epidemic, demand could outstrip the state's supply of
these devices by more than 300 percent, federal computer models indicate.” See Jim
Nesbitt, N.C. Arms Against Threat of Flu Pandemic, NORTH CAROLINA NEWS &
OBSERVER (Nov. 26, 2006), http://www.ncprogress.org/PDF/120306newsobserver_com_NC_arms_against_threat_of_flu_pandemic.pdf; see also Press
Release, New York State Health Department, New York State Health Department Seeks
Public Engagement on Ventilator Allocation Guidelines (Aug. 23, 2007),
https://www.health.ny.gov/press/releases/2007/2007-08-23_vent_comments.htm;
Sheri Fink, Preparing for a Pandemic, State Health Departments Struggle With Rationing
Decisions, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 24, 2009),
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See Nesbitt, supra note 270.
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and compelling state interest in denying a religious exemption to
medical futility laws.
In addition to these professional autonomy and public
health compelling interests, the state has an interest in preventing
“an administrative problem of such magnitude” as to render the
religious exemptions unworkable.272 In the context of medical
futility statutes, the state’s interest here is exceedingly strong.
The basis for this interest is the inability of distinguishing
between sincere and insincere religious requests.273 A state’s
interest may become compelling when viewed in the aggregate,
even if it might not be as compelling when viewed through one
specific claim.274 As William Marshall explains,
[i]f, for example, one factory is exempt from antipollution requirements, the state's interest in
protecting air quality will not be seriously
disturbed. When many factories pollute, on the
other hand, the state interest is seriously
threatened. Weighing the state interest against a
narrow class seeking exemption is similar to
asking whether this particular straw is the one
that breaks the camel's back.275
The 2014 Hobby Lobby case made clear that the compelling state
interest should be determined by looking “beyond broadly
formulated interests” to “scrutiniz[e] the asserted harm of
granting specific exemptions to particular religious claimants.”276
This means that the state should question whether the marginal
interest is compelling in denying this particular type of exemption to
this class as opposed to its global state interest in passing the
statute as it applies to everyone.
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c. The Compelling Interests Must Also Be the Least Restrictive Means
Necessary
Even though promoting professional autonomy and
ethics and public health interests are each considered
compelling, just as with all other state interests, they must also
be the least restrictive necessary.277 The Seventh Circuit recently
reminded us in the context of the Affordable Care Act’s
mandatory contraception coverage, “[s]trict scrutiny requires a
substantial congruity—a close ‘fit’—between the governmental
interest and the means chosen to further that interest. . . . There
are many ways to promote public health and gender equality,
almost all of them less burdensome on religious liberty.”278 The
government cannot prevail by articulating general compelling
interests.279 The contraceptive mandate in Hobby Lobby
ultimately failed for this reason, as the Supreme Court conceded
that the state interests in not requiring cost-sharing for women
might be compelling.280 However, those challenging the mandate
successfully argued that the federal government could subsidize
the purchase of contraceptives for employees whose religious
employers rejected coverage.281 This meant that the mandatory
contraception coverage violated the federal RFRA because it was
not the least restrictive means necessary for furthering the costsharing and public health interests.282 Because the various state
RFRAs also require strict scrutiny, the state’s interests must also
satisfy this “least restrictive” burden.283 However, for some of the
states’ interests in medical futility statutes, this burden is more
easily overcome.
277
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As applied to medical futility statutes, there are, indeed,
other ways the state could control against the inability to ration
life-sustaining care in the event of a pandemic. Specifically, the
state could suspend medical futility statutes in the event of a
pandemic, but not before. Therefore, a medical futility statute
that applies in non-pandemic situations may not be considered
the least restrictive necessary for this particular need to ration
life-saving technologies during public health crises. The states
would need to advance another compelling interest to ensure
that the statute passes a state RFRA analysis.
A better source for upholding medical futility statutes is
the state’s interest in professional autonomy and ethics. Medical
futility statutes that do not provide adequate means for the
patient to transfer (e.g., by not affording the family a sufficient
amount of time to locate an alternative facility) might violate a
state RFRA by not being the least restrictive means necessary to
further this specific government interest. However, if the statute
provides for some amount of notice to the patient or his family
and an opportunity to find an alternative provider, it would likely
satisfy strict scrutiny. The state could argue that the provider’s
autonomy is not excessively infringed if the provider must give
the family a week’s notice before terminating futile treatments.
But the physician’s autonomy and professional ethics would be
violated by forcing them, on the patient’s religious grounds, to
provide indefinite futile treatments. The state has a clear interest
in limiting the patients’ ability to commandeer providers in this
way.
The state’s interest in managing the administrative
burden bolsters the “least restrictive” prong of strict scrutiny. As
Thomas Berg explains, “[t]he threat of cumulative exemptions
comes not only from other sincere religious objectors, but from
other persons who could feign the same objection to get the
benefits of exemption.”284 Further, the text of the First
Amendment constrains any deep scrutiny into desperate patients
who might try to game the system, because the state cannot

284
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inquire too closely into whether the belief is truly religious,
sincere, or even shared with other members of the same faith.285
Given that many people find religion and God near the
end of their lives and in response to medical crisis, limiting the
exemptions to a manageable number would be impossible. Here
the analysis of whether the interest is compelling dovetails with
the question of whether the statute is the least restrictive means
necessary. The fact that there is no way to more narrowly tailor
the statute to protect religious freedoms renders the interest in
categorical non-exemption compelling and also the least
restrictive means necessary.
Any patient could request that they be provided indefinite
life support on religious grounds. This could happen if patients
became aware that this was the only way to receive futile
treatment. The inability to distinguish sincere from insincere
claims, and the likelihood that most patients could feign sudden
belief in miracles bolsters the state’s claim that the statutes are
the least restrictive means possible to further the stated legislative
interests. The nature of medical futility decisions is unique.
There are no alternatives to indefinitely providing futile
treatments. The only potential concession, though not an
alternative, is to grant these patients a certain amount of time to
pray for a miracle, which many providers (and futility statutes)
already do.286 Unilateral withdrawal is almost never invoked
unless the team has already given the patient a significant
amount of time to recover.287 Despite this, there must be some
principled limit on the amount of time a patient or his surrogate
could mandate clinically futile care. Otherwise, without a limit,
once clinically futile treatment is provided, it becomes impossible
to introduce another non-arbitrary reason for withdrawing the
treatment at a later date. The medical standard of care provides
that principled limit. Any other standard introduces an arbitrary
limit, and creates its own potential for unfair discrimination.
Contrast this with the religious freedom cases where
exemptions were granted. The exemptions from working on the
285
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Sabbath, are not likely to overwhelm employers or employee
benefit programs. For personal reasons, other employees will
choose to work on Saturdays and a minority of religions
celebrate a Saturday Sabbath. In those contexts, the fear of
numerous (even feigned) religious exemptions does not swallow
the statute and make it unworkable. There is potential for high
school students to request not to finish high school on religious
grounds, such as those made by the Old Order Amish in Yoder.288
However, either the Supreme Court was not concerned that these
exemptions would overwhelm the states or they felt that in that
particular case the Old Order Amish had demonstrated sufficient
sincerity and vocational alternatives.289 Either way, respected
religious freedom scholars such as Douglas Laycock agree that
“the number of potential claims is relevant to assessing the
government's interest . . . if the government has a compelling
interest in denying exemption to the whole group of similarly
situated objectors, it also has a compelling interest in denying
exemption to each one of them.”290
d. There Are at Least Three Compelling State Interests that Are the
Least Restrictive Means Necessary
There are at least three state interests that are compelling
and the least restrictive means necessary. These are: a) respect
for the professional autonomy of physicians, b) the need to
distinguish harming patients from healing, and c) the need to
manage the administrative burden of numerous claims. Given
the multiple compelling state interests in denying a religious
exemption in medical futility cases, and the inability to
accommodate religious believers without exposing hospitals
and providers to an unlimited conscription of services, it seems
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quite unlikely that a petitioner would prevail on state RFRA
grounds.
i.Religious Patients Would Likely Not Prevail on a Free Exercise Claim
Given that the medical futility statutes likely satisfy the
strict scrutiny required of the state RFRAs, they therefore also
satisfy the lesser-included rational basis test required of the First
Amendment. Recall that following Smith, the federal
Constitution does not require a state’s interest in the statute to be
compelling if it is generally-applicable, which all of the medical
futility statutes are.291 The federal RFRA does not apply to state
laws. Therefore, we can conclude that religious patients
claiming that medical futility statutes violate their religious free
exercise will have a very difficult time prevailing. Even so, this
only answers the legal questions.
CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, when physicians concern themselves
chiefly with the legal ramifications, they lose sight of the
important ethical dimensions of these cases. Whereas the courts
are not allowed to inquire into whether a patient’s religious belief
is sincere or shared with members of their faith, this is precisely
what a chaplain or social worker should do. Outside of the
domain of constitutional law, one medical scholar claimed that:
[c]laims about miracles may . . . be subjected to
scrutiny according to the criteria of the patient’s
faith. Faith is, in this sense, public and not
private. Judging the authenticity of patients’ or
families’ claims about miracles therefore
involves examining such claims in light of the
deposit of faith of the person’s own religious
tradition.292
Knowing whether the patient shares these beliefs with members
of her faith is crucial to ruling out denial or negative
psychological coping. In many cases where a patient begs for
more time for a miracle to occur, the patient is likely unprepared
Emp’t Div., Dep’t. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
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for death and expressing this in terms of needing a divine
intervention. Inquiring into the basis of the belief in miracles
would allow the clinical team to determine whether the patient
is a true believer, or in need of psychological as well as spiritual
counseling before the treatments are refused or withdrawn.
Focusing on these dimensions allows providers to ask the
pressing ethical questions that would not be allowed or
encouraged under a pure constitutional or RFRA analysis.
Efforts to educate providers should disambiguate the legal from
the ethical, and emphasize the ethical importance of asking
questions that are foreign to the law.

